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THIRD-PARTY REMOVAL OF AN ENTIRE CASE:
WHO CAN REMOVE, WHO CANNOT
Pursuant to section 1441 of the Judicial Code,' a defendant may remove
an entire civil case' from a state court to a federal court provided a removable
claim exists that is separate from and independent of an otherwise
nonremovable claim.3 The separate and independent claim requirement of sec-
tion 1441(c) deters a plaintiff from adding unrelated claims to prevent the
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982). Section 1441 of the Judicial Code (§ 1441) provides for removal
in state civil actions of claims over which a federal district court would have had original jurisdic-
tion. See id.; see also id. § 1442 (permitting removal from state court to federal court of suits
against federal officers); id. § 1443 (permitting removal from state court to federal court of civil
rights suits); id. § 1444 (permitting removal from state court to federal court of suits against
United States); id. § 1445 (listing nonremovable actions); id. § 1446 (outlining procedure for
removal); id. § 1447 (outlining procedure after removal); id. § 1448 (outlining procedure for ser-
vice of process after removal). See generally IA J. MooE & B. RiNGLE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 0.156[l], at 15-19 (1983-84 Cum. Supp.) (discussing history of removal jurisdiction).
The basic principles governing a federal court's federal question jurisdiction, diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction, and the jurisdictional amount apply to cases a defendant attempts to
remove from a state court to a federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982). Federal district courts
have jurisdiction over actions arising under the Constitution and federal laws. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)
(1982); see Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936) (federal right or
immunity must be essential element of plaintiff's case to constitute federal question). See general-
ly IA MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra, 0.168[2], at 539-40 (criticizing language in Gully
v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian for failing to distinguish between constitutional and statutory
removal power). Federal district courts also may exercise original jurisdiction over controversies
between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982). The constitutional basis for diver-
sity jurisdiction appears in Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CoNST.
art. III, § 2 (Congress has power to bestow upon federal courts authority to preside over con-
troversies between parties of diverse state citizenship). Formerly, federal courts required complete
diversity to exercise federal jurisdiction when a suit involved more than two parties. See Strawbridge
v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806) (each plaintiff must be able to sue each defen-
dant for complete diversity to exist). Complete diversity, however, is not constitutionally man-
dated and minimal diversity is permissible. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386
U.S. 523, 530-32 (1967) (federal jurisdiction attaches when two or more claimants are of diverse
citizenship regardless of citizenship of rival claimants). The amount in controversy must exceed
$10,000 for diversity jurisdiction to apply. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976). But see id. § 1331(a) (1982)
(no minimum amount-in-controversy requirement exists for federal question jurisdiction).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982). Pursuant to § 1441(c) a defendant may remove an entire
case without limiting removal to certain claims. Id.; see infra notes 130-34 and accompanying
text (discussing constitutionality of removing entire case from state court to federal court); see
also infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text (most courts allowing third-party removal of en-
tire case remand principal claim to state court).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982). A defendant's right to remove a civil case from a state
court to a federal court is entirely statutory. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.)
304, 349 (1816) (Constitution does not provide expressly for removal); Libhart v. Santa Monica
Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979) (courts derive removal jurisdiction from statutory
authorization of Congress). Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution provides the con-
stitutional basis for a statute governing removal. See U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2 (grant to Congress
of power to regulate business of federal courts). A provision for removal has existed since the
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defendant from removing a case to federal court." The Supreme Court has
held that no separate and independent claim exists when a plaintiff seeks relief
for a single wrong resulting from an "interlocked series of transactions.'"
While the Supreme Court has addressed the applicability of the separate and
independent requirement of section 1441(c) to cases involving the plaintiff and
Judiciary Act of 1789. 1 Stat. 73, c. 20, § 12 (1789). Congress established removal jurisdiction
to protect nonresident defendants from the local prejudices of state courts by enabling defen-
dants to litigate certain controversies in a neutral, federal forum. See Warren, New Light on
the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 H~Av. L. Rav. 49, 91-92 (1923) (fear that
states would not enforce federal laws prompted changes in removal jurisdiction during nineteenth
century); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b) (1982) (only defendants may remove action from state
to federal courts). Congress has questioned whether federal forums actually are neutral. See H.R.
REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1947) reprinted in Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)
(1982) (provisions for removal because of prejudice or local influence no longer apply). Between
1875 and 1887, plaintiffs and defendants could remove an action from a state court to a federal
court. See 18 Stat. 470, c. 137 § 2 (1875) (jurisdictional amount of $500 was only restriction
to removal). In 1887, however, Congress limited the removal right to defendants. See 24 Stat.
552 (1887), corrected 25 Stat. 433 (1888).
A state's removal provisions cannot control the removal provisions of the federal statute.
See Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 580 (1954) (definition of
defendant for removal purposes is federal matter). The burden is on the defendant to show that
removal is proper. See B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1981) (party
urging federal jurisdiction bears burden of showing propriety of removal). In cases with joint
defendants, all defendants must join in petition to remove. See Bradley v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 382 F.2d 415, 419 (8th Cir. 1967) (federal statute treats plural defendants collaterally); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982) (providing for removal by joint defendants).
4. See Lewin, The Federal Courts' Hospitable Back Door-Removal of "Separate and
Independent" Non-Federal Causes of Action, 66 HARv. L. REv. 423, 426 (1953) (plaintiff may
not defeat removal by joining nonremovable claim). If § 1441(c) did not provide for the removal
of an entire case when removable and nonremovable claims coexist in the case, a plaintiff could
defeat the defendant's right of removal simply by joining a claim over which a federal court
does not have jurisdiction. See Continental Resources & Mineral Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co.,
546 F. Supp. 850, 852 (S.D. W.Va. 1982) (purpose of § 1441(c) is to enable defendant to remove
case despite plaintiff's joinder of otherwise nonremovable claim).
For a defendant to remove an action from a state court to a federal court, the state court
first must have subject matter jurisdiction over the issues involved. See Lambert Run Coal Co.
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 261 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (federal court acquires no jurisdiction
through removal if state court did not have jurisdiction). But see IA MooRE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE, supra note 1, 0.157[3.-2], at 60 (federal courts should not always apply rigid dismissal
rule when state court does not have original jurisdiction prior to removal). A federal court exer-
cises original jurisdiction, not appellate jurisdiction, over issues in a case that defendant removes
to federal court. See Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448, 452 (1942) (federal law governs
proceeding in removed cases). All petitions for removal go directly to federal court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(a) (1982) (defendants seeking removal must file petition with federal district court); see
also IA MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, 0.168[2], at 537 (federal courts determine
removability). See generally 14 C. WROHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3721, at 520 (1976 & Supp. 1982) (discussing differences between removal jurisdic-
tion and original jurisdiction)..
5. See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951) (defendants' failure
to compensate plaintiff for fire loss under insurance policy constituted single wrong and therefore
no separate and independent claim existed). In American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, a Texas
citizen sued two out-of-state insurance companies and a Texas insurance agent in Texas state
1534
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the original defendant, confusion remains over whether a third-party defendant6
may remove an entire case from a state court to a federal court pursuant to
the separate and independent claim requirement of section 1441(c).7
Federal third-party practice permits a defendant to join another party who
is or may be liable for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the original
defendant. 8 Third-party practice enables the original defendant, as a third-
party plaintiff, to implead into the action a potentionally liable third party
who then becomes the third-party defendant.9 The purpose of impleader is
to avoid circuity of actions." By disposing of several related claims in one
action, courts reduce multiplicity of litigation and increase the likelihood of
consistent results.I The federal third-party practice rule is rule 14 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits a defendant to implead into a suit
court claiming damages for loss of insured property. Id. at 7-8. The insurance companies remov-
ed the case to federal court. Id. The Supreme Court held that the insurance companies improper-
ly removed the case to federal court. Id. at 13-16. The Court held that no claim or cause of
action separate from and independent of the state claim existed in the controversy because the
plaintiff suffered a single wrong. Id. at 14. The single wrong to the plaintiff was the failure
to pay compensation for lost property, regardless of which defendant was liable. Id. at 14-15.
In denying removal, the Court attached significant weight to the facts that the damages arose
from a single incident and that each of the three claims the plaintiff asserted involved substantial-
ly the same facts and transactions. Id. at 14-16.
6. See infra notes 8-12 and accompanying text (defining third-party defendant and discussing
third-party practice in general).
7. See Harper v. Sonnabend, 182 F. Supp. 594, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (third-party claim
was not removable because claim was not separate and independent). In Harper v. Sonnabend,
the court noted that the field of third-party removal "luxuriates in riotous uncertainty." Id.;
see 14 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 4, § 3724, at 643-45 (neither Congress
nor Supreme Court has addressed whether third-party claims are removable to federal court).
8. FED. R. CIrv. P. 14(a); see Lasa Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni v. Alex-
ander, 414 F.2d 143, 146 (6th Cir. 1969) (impleader enables courts to adjudicate rights of all
parties in one action). But see United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Perkins, 388 F.2d 771,
773 (10th Cir. 1968) (court must prohibit impleader when third-party complaint requires court
to try issues not involved in main claim without serving any convenience).
9. See, e.g., Equilease Corp. v. Jefferson Bank, 88 F.R.D. 208, 209 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (defend-
ant bank impleaded bank's vice president for liability on letter of credit, alleging that vice presi-
dent conspired with others to defraud bank); Wanta v. Powers, 478 F. Supp. 990, 992 (M.D.
Pa. 1979) (defendant trucking company impleaded third-party defendant from whom defendant
had leased truck involved in accident, alleging that third-party defendant may be liable for indem-
nification of plaintiff's claim pursuant to lease agreement); Goldstein v. Compudyne Corp., 45
F.R.D. 467, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (defendant manufacturer of jet testing machine impleaded plain-
tiff's employer, alleging that third-party defendant employer was liable to plaintiff for injuries
plaintiff sustained in machine explosion because employer operated machine negligently and failed
to employ proper personnel).
10. See Colton v. Swain, 527 F.2d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1975) (impleader promotes public
policy against unnecessary adjudications); American Export Lines, Inc. v. Revel, 262 F.2d 122,
124-25 (4th Cir. 1958) (impleader saves time and cost of duplicating evidence by enabling parties
to assert claims and defenses in one action); see also American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Greyhound
Corp., 232 F.2d 89, 92 (5th Cir. 1956) (courts must balance policy of avoiding duplication of
actions against prejudice third-party defendant might suffer).
11. See United States v. Grasso, 380 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1967) (use of impleader reduces
litigation by enabling court to adjudicate issues with basically same facts in one suit).
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other defendants who are or may be liable to the original defendant for all
or part of the original defendant's liability to the plaintiff. ' 2 Numerous states
fashion their third-party practice rules after rule 14 by limiting impleader to
parties who are or may be liable to the defendant only.I3 Some state legislatures,
however, have not incorporated the federal rule language verbatim into their
state's third-party practice rule, resulting in different standards for impleader
in state and federal courts." Nonetheless, in third-party removal cases, the
state's third-party practice controls because the third-party plaintiff impleads
the third-party defendant into state court. 5 Once under the jurisdiction of
the state court, the third-party defendant must rely on section 1441 to remove
the case to federal court.'
6
While section 1441(c) clearly permits removal of an entire case by the
original defendant, a distinct split of authority among the federal courts ex-
ists regarding whether a third-party defendant can remove an entire case from
a state court to a federal court.' Only one federal court of appeals has ad-
dressed whether a third-party defendant can remove an entire case from a
state court to a federal court under section 1441. 8 In Carl Heck Engineers,
12. See, e.g., ALA. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (impleader is proper only if third-party defendant is
or may be liable to original defendant); ARK. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (same); DEL. SUPER. CT. Civ.
R. 14(a) (same); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180(a) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-14(a) (1982) (same);
KAN. R. Crv. P. 60-214(a) (same); Ky. R. Cirv. P. 14.01 (same); MD. R. P. 315(a) (same); N.Y.
Civ. PRhc. LAw § 1007 (McKinney 1976) (same); N.C. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (same); TENN. R. Civ.
P. 14.01 (same); VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:10 (same); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (same); see also LA.
CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 1111 (West 1960) (defendant may implead third-party defendant
who is or may be liable to defendant for principal demand).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a); see Novinger v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co., 89 F.R.D.
588, 594 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (pursuant to federal impleader rule defendant may not implead third-
party defendant on basis that third-party defendant is solely liable to plaintiff). But see infra
note 14 (listing state rules permitting impleader when third-party defendant is independently liable
to plaintiff).
14. See, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 663-17 (1976) (defendant may implead person not party
to action who is or may be liable to defendant or to plaintiff); TEx. R. PRAc. 38(a) (same);
PA. R. Civ. P. 2252(a) (defendant may implead person who may or may not be party to action
who is liable to defendant or to plaintiff).
15. See United States Nat'l Bank in Johnstown v. H. & D. Leasing, Inc., 299 Pa. Super.
422, 423-24, 445 A.2d 826, 827-28 (1982) (state impleader rule enabled defendant truck owners
to implead insurance company in bank's suit for repayment of loan); Smith, Kline & French
Laboratories v. Just, 126 Ga. App. 643, 644-45, 191 S.E.2d 632, 636-37 (1972) (state impleader
rule enabled physician whom plaintiff sued for wrongful death to implead pharmaceutical manufac-
turer based on breach of implied warranty of safety and fitness for intended use).
16. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing removal of case from state court
to federal court under § 1441).
17. IA MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE, supra note 1, 0.167[10], at 510-11. Professor Moore
argues that a removal statute limits the right of removal to claims the plaintiff joins on the theory
that the plaintiff should control the case. Id. at 511-12; see infra notes 73-77 and accompanying
text (discussing view that only removable claims are claims plaintiff joins in original complaint).
18. See Carl Heck Eng'rs, Inc. v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 136-37 (5th
Cir. 1980) (permitting third-party removal of entire case); see also Marsh Inv. Corp. v. Langford,
652 F.2d 583, 584 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (affirming district court's decision to allow third-
party removal), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 sub. nom. Ponchartrain State Bank v. Marsh Inv.
Corp. (1982). But see Westwood Dev. Co. v. Higley, 266 F.2d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1959) (claim
1536
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Inc. v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury,'9 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a third-party defendant's removal of an entire case was proper because
the controversy between the original defendant and the third-party defendant
was separate from and independent of the main claim.2" In Carl Heck, the
plaintiff, Carl Heck Engineers, Inc., entered into a contract with the defen-
dant, Lafourche, to supply Lafourche with engineering services in connection
with a road construction project.' Lafourche entered into a contract with
the third-party defendant, Maryland Casualty Company, whereby Maryland
Casualty agreed to hold Lafourche harmless from liabilities to parties assert-
ing liens against funds Lafourche retained on Lafotirche's contract with
Lambert, the general contractor.22 Lambert subsequently abandoned the road
project, causing a delay in the completion of the road project.2 3 The delay
in the road construction work prompted Carl Heck to sue Lafourche for breach
of contract in a Louisiana state court.2 Lafourche, as a third-party plaintiff,
impleaded Maryland Casualty, seeking indemnification against Carl Heck's
claims. 2s Maryland Casualty removed the entire action to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.26 Lafourche argued that
Maryland Casualty improperly had removed the case to federal court and
moved to remand the entire case to state court. 27 The district court, however,
held that removal was proper because Lafourche's third-party claim would
be removable to federal court if Lafourche had sued on that claim alone. 28
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's decision that removal
was proper, despite a lack of diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and
against impleaded third-party defendant was not removable because claim was merely notice to
defend and did not constitute "cause of action" within meaning of § 1441(c)); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)
(1982) (providing for removal of separate and independent claim or cause of action).
19. 622 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1980).
20. Id. at 136.
21. Id. at 134. In Carl Heck Eng'rs, Inc. v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, the defendant
agreed to pay the plaintiff liquidated damages if the contractor caused delay in the completion
of a road construction project. Id.
22. Id. In Carl Heck, the third-party defendant secured the contract between the defendant
and the contractor for the construction and repair of certain roads by paying a performance




25. Id. at 134-35; see LA. CODE Crv. PROC. ANN. art. 1111 (West 1960) (authorizing im-
pleader of third-party defendant). The Louisiana impleader statute enables a defendant to im-
plead a third-party defendant if the third-party defendant is liable to the plaintiff. See Rouley
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 786, 794 (W.D. La. 1964) (Louisiana impleader
rule has same meaning as federal impleader rule).
26. 622 F.2d at 135. In CarlHeck, the Fifth Circuit held that the entire case was removable
to federal court but that the district court properly exercised discretion under § 1441(c) to sever
the claims and remand the plaintiff's original cause of action to the state court so that removal
did not defeat the plaintiff's choice of forum. Id. at 135-36; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982) (pro-
viding court with discretion to remand claims not otherwise within jurisdiction of federal court).
27. 622 F.2d at 135.
28. Id. at 137.
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the third-party plaintiff.2 9 The Fifth Circuit held that the district court would
have had jurisdiction over the case if third-party plaintiff Lafourche had sued
third-party defendant Maryland Casualty on the indemnity claim alone because
Lafourche and Maryland Casualty were diverse parties.3" Pursuant to section
1441(b), a defendant not residing in the state in which a plaintiff brings an
action may remove a case to a federal court to protect the defendant from
a possibly prejudicial state court.' The Fifth Circuit asserted that while Lafour-
che's claim for indemnity against Maryland Casualty was not unrelated to
plaintiff Carl Heck's claim for breach of contract, Lafourche's indemnity claim
was sufficiently independent of Carl Heck's claim under section 1441(c) to
warrant removal because the two claims involved distinct contractual
obligations. 2 The Carl Heck court held that removal was proper because
Lafourche's claim against Maryland Casualty for indemnity presented a real
controversy that parties often litigate in suits containing no ancillary claims.33
Although the Fifth Circuit is the only federal circuit court of appeals to
examine third-party removal, several federal district courts have addressed the
issue of whether a third-party defendant may remove an entire case from a
state court to a federal court .3  As in Carl Heck, most courts permitting a
third-party defendant to remove an entire case from a state court to a federal
court rely on section 1441(c). 31 For example, in Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Aaron-Lincoln Mercury, Inc. ,36 the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois upheld a third-party defendant's removal of a case from
a state court to a federal court because the third-party claim was separate
from and independent of the plaintiff's original complaint . 3  In Ford Motor
29. Id. at 134; see id. at 134 n.4 (plaintiff and defendant were citizens of Louisiana).
30. Id. at 136; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982) (grant of federal jurisdiction in diversity
cases); see also supra note 1 (discussing federal diversity jurisdiction).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982).
32. 622 F.2d at 136. In Carl Heck, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant
of summary judgment for the third-party defendant because the contract between the third-party
plaintiff and the third-party defendant did not require the third-party defendant to indemnify
the third-party plaintiff under Louisiana law. Id. at 136-37; see Luoisiana Public Works Act,
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38:2242 (West 1980) (engineer must be employee of contractor to be
eligible to receive funds due to contractor).
33. 622 F.2d at 136.
34. See infra note 35 (citing federal district courts permitting third-party removal); infra
note 54 (citing federal district courts denying third-party removal).
35. See, e.g., Columbia Gas Co. v. Statewide Hi-Way Safety, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 182, 182-84
(D.N.J. 1982) (third-party claim for insurance fraud was separate from and independent of plaintiff's
wrongful death claim); Peturis v. Fendley, 496 F. Supp. 203, 204-05 (S.D. Ala. 1980) (third-party
claim for conversion of insurance proceeds was separate from and independent of plaintiff's claim
for breach of warranty); Ted Lokey Real Estate Co. v. Gentry, 336 F. Supp. 741, 742-43 (N.D.
Tex. 1972) (claim that third-party defendant failed to pay taxes third-party defendant had col-
lected from third-party plaintiff was separate from and independent of plaintiff's claim for sums
defendant owed plaintiff).
36. 563 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
37. Id. at 1111-12.
1538
THIRD-PARTY REMOVAL
Credit Co., the Ford Motor Credit Corporation sued a franchisee in an Il-
linois state court alleging that the franchisee breached a financing contract."
The franchisee, as a third-party plaintiff, then brought a third-party claim
against the Ford Motor Company, alleging that Ford had used false statements
to induce the franchisee to purchase a Ford dealership franchise."9 Ford
removed the case to federal district court."° To decide whether the district
court could exercise jurisdiction over the case, the court raised the issue of
removability sua sponte.4' The district court explained that the course of con-
duct by which Ford induced the franchisee to enter into the dealership contract
was separate from the credit corporation's conduct in lending the franchisee
money because Ford's liability did not depend upon the result in the action
between Ford Motor Credit and the franchisee.42 The court, therefore, main-
tained that the third-party claim against Ford was separate from and indepen-
dent of the principal claim against the credit corporation within the meaning
of section 1441(c). 3 The Ford Motor Credit Co. court held that because the
third-party plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentation claim was separate from
and independent of the plaintiff's claim on the financing contract, removal
was proper.
4 4
The separate and independent claim language of section 1441(c) also served
as the basis for third-party removal in Bond v. Doig."1 In Bond, the plaintiffs
sued Doig in the Superior Court of New Jersey for damages after Doig's boat,
on which the plaintiffs were sailing, capsized.41 When Doig's insurance car-
rier, Reliance Insurance Company, refused to defend Doig and denied coverage,
38. Id. at 1109. In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Aaron-Lincoln Mercury, Inc., the plaintiff
and defendant were citizens of Illinois. Id. The defendant could not remove the case to federal
court because diversity of citizenship did not exist and the case did not involve a federal question.
Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982) (provision for removal jurisdiction in cases dealing with diver-
sity of citizenship or federal questions); see also supra note 1 (discussing federal question and
diversity jurisdiction).
39. 563 F. Supp. at 1109. In addition to alleging that the Ford Motor Company unlawfully
had induced the franchisee to purchase a Ford dealership, the franchisee in Ford Motor Credit
Co. alleged that Ford had violated the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act when selling the fran-
chise. Id.; see Franchise Disclosure Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 2, 701-740 (Smith-Hurd
1984) (providing for full disclosure of interests in franchise prior to sale).
40. 563 F. Supp. at 1109.
41. Id. at 1109-10; see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (court decides whether subject matter jurisdic-
tion exists).
42. 563 F. Supp. at 111 I. In Ford Motor Credit Co., the court held that the determination
of Ford's liability regarding the false representations did not depend on the resolution of the
contract action between the credit company and the franchisee. Id. Furthermore, the Ford Motor
Credit Co. court noted that Ford would have been able to remove the action to federal court
if the franchisee had sued Ford before the credit company had sued the francisee. Id. at 1114.
43. Id. at 1111.
44. Id.
45. 433 F. Supp. 243 (D.N.J. 1977).
46. Id. at 244. In Bond v. Doig, Doig offered to take a group of members of the American
Association of Retired Persons for a ride around a lake in Doig's boat. Id. Doig charged $2
per person. Id. Approximately 20 persons accepted Doig's offer for a ride in the boat, which
1984] 1539
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Doig impleaded Reliance as a third-party defendant . 4  Thereafter, Reliance
removed the entire case to the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey.48 The plaintiffs moved to remand the case to state court.
49
The Bond court noted that when Doig filed a third-party complaint against
Reliance, a controversy arose over whether Doig's policy covered the accident.5 0
The controversy, the court asserted, was the proper subject for a declaratory
judgment remedy in an action between Doig and Reliance alone.' The court
noted that frequently an insured brings a declaratory judgment action to deter-
mine the limits of an insurance policy even though the insured is not a defen-
dant in any pending litigation.5 2 The court, therefore, held that the third-party
claim on the insurance contract was separate from and independent of the
plaintiffs' negligence claims because the parties to the insurance contract could
have litigated the insurance-related issues independently of the negligence-related
issues.1
3
Despite the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' declaration that a third-party
defendant can remove an entire case from a state court to a federal court,
most federal district courts have decided that third-party claims are not
removable.- 4 The majority of courts opposing third-party removal of an en-
tire case base their reasoning on the theory that courts should construe jurisdic-
normally held only 11 or 12 people. Id. Three lawsuits followed as a result of the boat's capsiz-
ing. Id.
47. Id. In Bond, Doig obtained a policy to insure his vessel. Id. The insurance carrier refused
to cover the accident because the policy contained a clause stating that the insured would not
use the vessel for hire without the consent of the insurer. Id.
48. Id. In Bond, the insurance carrier removed the case to federal court on the basis of
diversity of citizenship. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982) (providing for remQval of controversy
between diverse parties). The insurance carrier in Bond was a citizen of Pennsylvania and Doig
was a citizen of either New York or New Jersey. 433 F. Supp. at 244. Doig's citizenship is unclear
because Doig slept on his vessel, which he moored on the New York side of Greenwood Lake,
but Doig also owned real estate in New Jersey. Id.
49. 433 F. Supp. at 244.
50. Id. at 249.
51. Id. Under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act parties may seek declarations of their
rights. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976); see FED. R. Civ. P. 57 (procedure for obtaining declaratory
judgment must conform to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). The United States Constitution,
however, limits declaratory judgments in federal courts to actual controversies. U.S. CoNsr. art.
III, § 2. A party need not have suffered a loss to sustain a declaratory judgment action. See
Peoples Bank v. Eccles, 64 F. Supp. 811, 812 (D.D.C. 1946) (declaratory judgment action pro-
vides means for settling rights in controversy that has not reached point where party seeks coer-
cive remedy).
52. 433 F. Supp. at 249.
53. Id. The Bond court maintained that the test for whether a claim is separate and in-
dependent is whether the parties can litigate the claim alone, without joinder or consolidation
with other claims. Id. at 248.
54. See, e.g., Continental Resources & Mineral Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co., 546 F. Supp.
850, 851 (S.D.W. Va. 1982) (third-party claim is not removable because third-party defendant
is not defendant within meaning of § 1441(a)); Knight v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 543 F. Supp.
915, 917-18 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (§ 1441(c) restricts removal to claims plaintiff joins); Avco-Aurora
Indus. Bank v. Cline, 459 F. Supp. 857, 858 (D. Colo. 1978) (third-party claim is ancillary and
does not provide federal court with jurisdiction over main claim).
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tional statutes in a way that would limit the scope of federal jurisdiction.5
Some courts have limited the scope of federal jurisdiction by holding that a
third-party defendant is not a defendant within the meaning of section 1441
and that section 1441 therefore confers the right to remove a case only on
original defendants.5 6 For example, in White v. Baltic Conveyor Co.," the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that section
1441(a) applies only to the defendant in the original complaint and not to
a third-party defendant."' Section 1441(a) permits a defendant to remove from
a state court to a federal court any action over which the federal court has
original jurisdiction. 9 In White, White sued the Baltic Conveyor Company
in a New Jersey state court for damages resulting from injuries White sustained
in a work-related accident. 60 Baltic brought a third-party complaint against
Standard Accident Insurance Company, Baltic's insurance carrier, to compel
Standard Accident to defend Baltic in the suit.6' The insurance carrier removed
the case to federal district court and White moved to remand the case to state
court, claiming that the federal court would not have had jurisdiction over
the main claim without the addition of the third-party claim.62 The White
court remanded the case to the New Jersey state court, noting that the in-
surance carrier could not remove the case to federal court pursuant to section
1441(a) because the insurer was not a named defendant in the original
55. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941) (Congress intended
to restrict jurisdiction of federal courts by removal); see also Hopkins Erecting Co. v. Briarwood
Apartments, 517 F. Supp. 243, 251-52 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (courts should construe § 1441 against
granting federal jurisdiction when possible).
56. See, e.g., Knight & Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 543 F. Supp. 915, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (limiting
removal to original defendants promotes uniformity of federal jurisdiction); Friddle v. Hardee's
Food Sys., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 148, 149 (W.D. Ark. 1981) (policy of strict construction leads
to conclusion that third-party defendants are not "defendants" within meaning of § 1441); Gar-
nas v. American Farm Equip. Co., 502 F. Supp. 349, 352 (D. N.D. 1980) (court refuses to modify
§ 1441 language by judicial flat).
57. 209 F. Supp. 716 (D.N.J. 1962).
58. Id. at 719; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982) (permitting defendants to remove actions
from state court to federal court provided federal court has original jurisdiction).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1976).
60. 209 F. Supp. at 717-18. In White v. Baltic Conveyor Co., the plaintiff sustained in-
juries when he caught his foot between a pulley and a chain on a conveyor. Id. at 718. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had installed the conveyor negligently. Id.
61. Id. In White, the plaintiff and the defendant were citizens of New Jersey. Id. at 717-18.
The third-party defendant, an insurance carrier, however, was a citizen of Michigan. Id. at 718;
see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982) (corporation is citizen of state of incorporation and state of cor-
poration's principal place of business).
62. 209 F. Supp. at 718; see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982) (district court has discretion to
remand case when defendant removed case improvidently); see also Stanhope v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 483 F. Supp. 275, 276 (W.D. Ark. 1980) (federal court has responsibility not to
act without jurisdiction and must remand case to state court if jurisdiction is lacking); cf. Barrett
v. McDonald's of Oklahoma City, 419 F. Supp. 792, 793 (,V.D. Okla. 1976) (plaintiff could
not force court to remand case by adding nondiverse parties to original complaint once removal
jurisdiction based on diversity attached).
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complaint.6" The White court maintained that defining a third-party defen-
dant as a "defendant" for purposes of section 1441(a) would be judicial legisla-
tion because section 1441(a) does not grant expressly the right of removal to
third-party defendants.
64
Closely related to the White court's reasoning that section 1441(a) does
not apply to third-party defendants is the theory that section 1441(c) limits
removal only to claims the plaintiff joins rather than to claims either the plain-
tiff or the defendant joins.6 1 In Shaver v. Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc. ,66
the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas denied
removal of a case from a state court to a federal court by a third-party defen-
dant on the grounds that the plaintiff had not joined the third-party defen-
dant in the original complaint. 67 In Shaver, the Shavers brought a wrongful
death action in Arkansas state court against Arkansas-Best Freight Systems,
Inc., seeking damages for deaths resulting from a highway accident." The
Shavers alleged that the defendant's negligent operation of a tractor-trailer
caused the deaths of the Shavers' son, daughter-in-law, and three
grandchildren. 69 Arkansas-Best filed a third-party complaint against the
Fruehauf Trailer Company, claiming that Fruehauf was liable to the Shavers
for the deaths of the Shavers' decedents.7" Arkansas-Best alleged that the trailer
Fruehauf had sold to Arkansas-Best was defective and that the defect was
the proximate cause of the collision between the decedents' automobile and
the tractor-trailer.' Fruehauf petitioned the district court to remove the case
63. 209 F. Supp. at 722. In White, the third-party defendant's main assertion was that
the third-party plaintiff's claim for indemnification constituted a removable separate and independent
claim under § 1441(c). Id. at 719-22; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982) (defendants may remove
separate and independent claims). The White court, however, rejected the third-party defendant's
argument because the third-party defendant was not a "defendant" qualified to remove under
the removal statute. 209 F. Supp. at 719-20; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982) (removing party
must be defendant).
64. 209 F. Supp. at 719-20; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982) (providing removal jurisdiction
for "defendants"); see also Share v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 F. Supp. 1107, 1108-09 (E.D.
Pa. 1982) (third-party claim is not removable because third-party defendant is not "defendant"
within meaning of § 1441(a)).
65. See, e.g., Morris v. Marshall County Bd. of Educ., 560 F. Supp. 43, 45 (N.D. W.Va.
1983) (§ 1441(c) does not entitle third-party defendant to invoke removal jurisdiction); Continen-
tal Resources & Mineral Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co., 546 F. Supp. 850, 852 (S.D. W. Va.
1982) (Congress intended removal statute to enable original defendant to remove entire case to
federal court); Lowe's of Montgomery, Inc. v. Smith, 432 F. Supp 1008, 1013 (M.D. Ala. 1977)
(defendant's joinder of third-party claim does not invest federal court with jurisdiction over state
claim); White v. Hughes, 409 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (W.D. Tenn. 1975) (strict construction of
removal statute precludes third-party removal).
66. 171 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Ark. 1959).
67. Id. at 763.
68. Id. at 755.
69. Id. at 755-56.
70. Id. at 756. In Shaver v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., the plaintiffs and the defendants
were citizens of Arkansas. Id. at 755. The third-party defendant, however, was a citizen of Michigan.
Id.
71. Id. at 756. In Shaver, the third-party plaintiff alleged that a defective king pin on the
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to federal court pursuant to section 1441(c) on the grounds that the third-
party claim that the trailer was defective was separate from and independent
of the original claim that Arkansas-Best operated the tractor-trailer
negligently." The Shaver court, however, declined to examine whether the
two claims were separate and independent.7 3 Instead, the court asserted that
section 1441(c) limits the removal of separate and independent claims to situa-
tions in which the plaintiff joined additional claims.74 The court reasoned that
limiting removal to claims the plaintiff joined comports with a congressional
intent to restrict removal to those claims section 1441 expressly permits.7 The
Shaver court held that if Congress had intended to permit third-party removal,
the language of section 1441 would have indicated this intention expressly.
76
Based on the determination that section 1441(c) limits removal to claims plain-
tiffs join, the Shaver court denied Fruehauf's petition for removal.
7
While some courts have denied third-party removal either because a third-
party defendant is not a defendant within the meaning of the removal statute"
or because the plaintiff did not join the third-party claim in the original
complaint," many courts impliedly acknowledge a third-party defendant's right
to remove but deny third-party removal on the basis of the separate and in-
dependent claim requirement of section 1441(c). 80 For example, in Luebbe v.
truck trailer was the proximate cause of the accident between the tractor-trailer and the automobile.
Id.
72. Id. at 758; see 28 U.S.C. 1441(c) (1982) (providing removal jurisdiction on basis of
separate and independent claim).
73. 171 F. Supp. at 762; cf. Share v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 F. Supp. 1107, 1108
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (court declined to examine whether third-party claim was separate from and
independent of principal claim because court decided third-party defendant was not "defendant"
within meaning of § 1441(a)).
74. 171 F. Supp. at 762.
75. See id. at 760; see also American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 9 (1951)
(Congress intended to simplify removal requirements by amending removal statute); infra notes
108-15 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent behind amendment to removal
statute).
76. 171 F. Supp. at 762-63.
77. Id. at 763.
78. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (cases holding that "defendants" within meaning
of § 1441 does not include third-party defendants).
79. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (cases holding that only claims plaintiff joins
are removable).
80. See, e.g., Soper v. Kahn, 568 F. Supp. 398, 404 (D. Md. 1983) (third-party claim against
legal publishing company for breach of warranty for fitness of intended use was not separate
from and independent of plaintiff's claim against attorney for legal malpractice); Parks v. Physi-
cians & Surgeons Bldg. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 883, 884-85 (W.D. Okla. 1971) (defendant's third-
party claim for indemnity was not separate from and independent of plaintiff's claim for damages
resulting from malfunctioning elevator because amount of damages in third-party claim necessarily
depended on outcome of main claim); Hyde v. Carder, 310 F. Supp. 1340, 1342 (W.D. Ky. 1970)
(third-party claim for breach of warranty of fitness against bottle manufacturer was not separate
from and independent of plaintiff's claim against grocer for injuries plaintiff sustained when
bottle grocer had sold plaintiff exploded); see also Chase v. North Am. Sup., Inc., 523 F. Supp.
378, 383 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (defendant's offering of another potentially liable defendant to plain-
tiff does not constitute joining separate and independent claim).
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Presbyterian Hospital in New York, 81 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York denied removal of a third-party claim because
the claim was not separate from and independent of the main claim. 2 In
Luebbe, the plaintiffs sued two physicians for medical malpractice, alleging
that the doctors were negligent while performing surgery on one of the
plaintiffs.8 3 One of the doctors brought a third-party products liability suit
against Codman & Shurtleff, Inc., the manufacturer of a surgical instrument
the doctors used during the plaintiff's operation, alleging that Codman &
Shurtleff had manufactured the instrument improperly.", Codman & Shurtleff,
as a third-party defendant, petitioned the district court pursuant to section
1441(c) to remove the entire suit to federal court." The Luebbe court held
that the products liability suit was not separate from and independent of the
medical malpractice suit because detailed evidence of the plaintiff's operation
played a role in the disposition of both controversies.8 6 In denying removal,
the Luebbe court noted that the plaintiff had sustained only one injury and
that rather than offering a distinct claim, the third-party claim merely added
to the suit another possible cause of the plaintiff's injury. 7 The court con-
cluded that the claims were not separate from and independent of each other
because important factual issues, such as the reactions and competence of the
doctors and the hospital, as well as the quality of the surgical instrument,
were common to both the medical malpractice claim and the products liability
claim.8
In a decision similar to Luebbe, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania refused removal of a case from a state court
to a federal court because the third-party claim was not separate from and
independent of the plaintiff's original claim. 9 In Chase v. North American
Systems, Inc.,90 the plaintiffs sued a manufacturer for damages the plaintiffs
sustained when a coffee maker the defendant had manufactured allegedly
caught fire, destroying the plaintiffs' home and personal property.9' The defen-
dant manufacturer filed a third-party complaint against the manufacturer of
81. 526 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
82. Id. at 1165.
83. Id. at 1163.
84. Id.
85. Id. In Luebbe v. Presbyterian Hosp. in N.Y., the third-party defendant manufacturer
based its right to remove the case on diversity of citizenship between the manufacturer and the
third-party plaintiff doctor. Id. at 1164.
86. Id. at 1165.
87. Id. In Luebbe, the plaintiffs intended to amend their complaint to include the manufac-
turer of the surgical instrument as a defendant in the main claim. Id. at 1164. The Luebbe court
noted that including the manufacturer in the main claim would defeat diversity jurisdiction. Id.;
see supra note 1 (discussing federal diversity jurisdiction).
88. 526 F. Supp. at 1165.
89. See Chase v. North Am. Sys., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 378, 382-83 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (third-
party complaint was not separate from and independent of main claim because third-party com-
plaint merely offered another defendant to plaintiff for single wrong).
90. 523 F. Supp. 378 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
91. Id. at 379-80. In Chase v. North Am. Sys., Inc., the plaintiffs sued the defendant in
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an electric can opener, asserting that the can opener, rather than the coffee
maker, caused the fire. 92 The manufacturer of the can opener, as a third-party
defendant, petitioned the district court to remove the entire case to federal
court.93 The court noted that section 1441(c) requires that a third-party claim
be both separate from and independent of the plaintiff's original complaint.9 4
To be separate and independent, the court explained, the claims must involve
entirely different legal issues.95 The Chase court maintained that the third-
party complaint merely offered another defendant to the plaintiff, and that
the issues of casuation and liability were identical in both the third-party claim
and the main claim.96 The court, therefore, concluded that the third-party
claim was not separate from and independent of the main claim.97 The Chase
court held that the case was not removable and granted the defendant's mo-
tion to remand.98
Despite the view that section 1441 does not permit a third-party defend-
ant to remove a case from a state court to a federal court, proponents of
third-party removal assert that courts should employ removal jurisdiction to
promote uniformity in the federal court system.99 Courts permitting third-party
removal typically hold that if a court does not allow removal by a third-party
Pennsylvania state court. Id. at 380. Despite diversity of citizenship between the Pennsylvania
plaintiffs and the Ohio defendant, the defendant elected to proceed in state court rather than
remove the action to federal court. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982) (provision for removal
jurisdiction in diversity cases).
92. 523 F. Supp. at 380; see PA. R. Crv. P. 2252(a) (defendant may join third-party defend-
ant who may be liable to plaintiff alone); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (limiting defendant's joinder
of third-party defendant to those parties who may be liable to defendant for all or part or plain-
tiff's claim). See generally supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text (discussion of third-party
practice).
93. 523 F. Supp. at 380. The third-party defendant in Chase asserted diversity of citizen-
ship in the third-party defendant's petition to remove the case to federal court. Id.; see supra
note 1 (discussing federal diversity jurisdiction).
94. 523 F. Supp. at 382-83. In Chase, the court noted that Congress had written § 1441(c)
in the conjunctive, requiring that third-party claims be both separate and independent. Id. at
382; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982) ("separate and independent claim" may be removable); cf.
Snow v. Powell, 189 F.2d 172, 174 (10th Cir. 1951) ("separate" means distinct and "indepen-
dent" means not contingent or conditioned); Her Majesty Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co., 379 F. Supp. 658, 661 (D. S.C. 1974) (even if claims are "separate," claims are not indepen-
dent when facts arise out of same transaction or incident).
95. 523 F. Supp. at 382.
96. Id. at 383.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Industrial Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D.N.J. 1954)
(denying third-party defendants right to remove makes removal dependent upon peculiarities of
state third-party practice). But see IA MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, 0.167[101,
at 510-12 (criticizing argument that precluding third-party removal would subvert goal of uniformity
of removal jurisdiction). Professor Moore urges limiting a defendant's removal right to cases
in which only the plaintiff joined separate and independent claims. Id. at 512. Such a limitation
eliminates the lack-of-uniformity problem that varied state impleader rules create. Cf. infra text
accompanying notes 101-04 (illustrating how different state impleader rules contribute to lack
of uniformity in applying removal jurisdiction).
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defendant, a state's third-party practice will dictate whether a federal court
has jurisdiction over a claim. 10 For example, if a state court interprets the
state's third-party practice rule as prohibiting impleader in a particular situa-
tion, a defendant who wishes to implead a party as a third-party defendant
must file a separate state suit against that party rather than include that party
in the ongoing action. 1" The second suit will be removable, provided the
defendant to the second suit complies with the requirements of section 1441.102
In a state where the courts interpret the state's third-party practice rule more
liberally, however, a sweeping denial of removal without regard to the cir-
cumstances of the case will preclude a third-party defendant from ever ob-
taining a federal forum.'0 The inconsistency that results from the existence
of varied state third-party practice rules controverts the Supreme Court's policy
of discouraging local law from affecting uniformity in federal removal
jurisdiction. 
0 4
Despite the argument that limiting removal jurisdiction yields inconsis-
tent results, most commentators on third-party removal jurisdiction generally
reject the proposition that section 1441 permits a third-party defendant to
remove an entire case from a state court to a federal court.' 5 Opponents of
third-party removal rely on a Supreme Court ruling that courts should con-
strue jurisdictional statutes against expanding federal jurisdiction by asserting
that only an original defendant may remove a case involving additional claims
100. See Carl Heck Eng'rs, Inc. v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 135-36 (5th
Cir. 1980) (using separate and independent requirement promotes uniform application of removal
statute); Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. v. Russian River County Sanitation Dist., 538 F. Supp.
488, 492 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (procedural accident that defendant joins party as third-party defend-
ant instead of as original defendant prevents joined party from obtaining federal forum).
101. See Gamble v. Central of Ga. Ry., 356 F. Supp. 324, 326-27 (M.D. Ala.) (explaining
theory that varying state third-party practice rules will lead to differing outcomes in removal
jurisdiction decisions), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); see also supra notes
12-14 and accompanying text (discussing state impleader rules); cf. infra note 138 (state impleader
rule cannot control federal jurisdiction).
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982) (general provisions for removal jurisdiction); see also id.
§ 1446 (stating procedure for removal).
103. See supra note 12 (listing states that design their third-party practice rules after federal
rule); supra note 14 (listing states with third-party practice rules different from federal rule).
104. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104 (1941) (courts should apply
§ 1441 uniformly throughout nation). But see IA MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1,
0.167[10], at 512-13 (denying third-party removal does not disrupt uniform application of § 1441).
105. See 1A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, 0.167[10], at 511-12 (removal statute
limits removal only to those claims that plaintiff joins); 14 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
supra note 4, § 3724, at 645-46 (courts should honor plaintiff's choice of forum); Moore & VanDer-
creek, Multi-Party, Multi-Claim Removal Problems: The Separate and Independent Claim Under
Section 1441(c), 46 IowA L. REv. 489, 509 (1961) (§ 1441(c) applies only to claims plaintiff joins).
But see Note, Federal Practice: Removal Problems-Third-Party Defendant, 7 OKLA. L. REV.
443, 461-63 (1954) (reasons for permitting defendant to remove suit to federal court apply to
third-party defendant). See generally Comment, Federal Jurisdiction-Removal by a Third-Party
Defendant to a District Court Under § 1441 of the Judicial Code, 37 ST. JosmS L. REv. 373,
379 (1963) (court need not determine whether third-party claim is separate and independent because
§ 1441 precludes third-party defendant from removing case to federal court).
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the plaintiff joined in the action." 6 Consequently, courts adhering to the theory
of limiting federal jurisdiction generally construe section 1441 against permit-
ting third-party removal because Congress did not provide expressly for the
removal of third-party claims in section 1441.1 °7
Courts denying third-party removal also justify their decisions on the basis
of a 1948 amendment to the removal statute, the stated purpose of which
is to reduce the number of cases removable to federal courts.' 0 The 1948
amendment substituted the present separate and independent claim language
of section 1441(c) for the separable controversy requirement of the former
removal statute. 0 9 Separable controversies involve the disputes arising between
the plaintiff and various defendants when the plaintiff joins more than one
defendant in one action."0 In substituting the separate and independent claim
language of 1441(c) for the separable controversy requirement of the former
removal statute, Congress required the presence of more than one cause of
action for removal to be proper."' By restricting removal to actions involving
more than one cause of action, Congress intended to limit the removal of
controversies between the original parties." 2 While the 1948 amendment to
the removal statute generally restricted removal by limiting the number of
removable controversies, Congress was silent on whether the third-party
removal of a case is proper.' '3 Moreover, a literal reading of section 1441(c)
106. See supra note 54 (citing cases refusing third-party removal); see also American Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 9-10 (1951) (congressional intent behind separate and in-
dependent claim requirement was to limit removal from state courts).
107. See Chase v. North Am. Sys., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 378, 380 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (Congress
expressly must confer removal jurisdiction on courts); Garnas v. American Farm Equip. Co.,
502 F. Supp. 349, 352 (D.N.D. 1980) (Congress has not indicated that § 1441 applies to third-
party defendants).
108. See H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2 (1947) reprinted in Reviser's Note,
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1976) (clarification of what constitutes separate and independent claim or
cause of action should make § 1441(c) less ambiguous).
109. See id. (§ 1441(c) permits removal of separate cause of action but prohibits removal
of separate controversy unless controversy constitutes separate and independent claim).
110. See Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913, 914-(S.D.N.Y.
1965) (plaintiff's joinder of claims against two defendants enabled one defendant to remove en-
tire case to federal court). In Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, Twentieth Century-
Fox sued Elizabeth Taylor and Richard Burton for breach of employment contracts, basing the
complaint on five separate causes of action. Id. at 914. Burton removed the entire case to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Id. Twentieth Century-Fox
moved to remand the case to New York State court, claiming that the claims against Burton
were not separate from and independent of the claims against Taylor because one incident led
to the breach of two employment contracts. Id. at 915. While the five causes of action represented
separable controversies, the Twentieth Century-Fox court upheld Burton's removal because the
two employment agreements constituted two separate and distinct contracts. Id. at 916-17.
Ill. See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1951) (separable con-
troversy is no longer ground for removal unless controversy also constitutes separate and inde-
pendent claim under § 1441(c)).
112. See id. at 10 (purpose of revision to removal statute was to abridge right of removal).
113. See C. WPuar, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 39, at 22 (1983) (amendment to §
1441(c) achieved purpose of reducing number of removable cases); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(1982) (statute does not mention third-party removal).
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does not preclude a third-party defendant from removing an entire case from
a state court to a federal court because the plaintiff did not join the defendant
in the original claim." 4 Congress' silence on third-party removal in the amend-
ment to the removal statute, therefore, indicates that Congress did not intend
necessarily to prohibit third-party defendants from attaining a federal forum
simply because the plaintiff had not joined the third-party defendant in the
original complaint. I,5
Although no indication exists that Congress intended to prohibit a third-
party defendant from removing a case from a state court to a federal court,
a third-party defendant nevertheless must qualify as a defendant within the
meaning of section 1441(a) to meet the requirements of section 1441(c)." 6 The
Supreme Court has defined a defendant as a party that has not submitted
voluntarily to a court's jurisdiction. ' 7 Whether a defendant submits to the
114. See Gamble v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 356 F. Supp. 324, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (Con-
gress would have written § 1441(c) more precisely if Congress had intended to limit removal to
claims plaintiff joins), rev'd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973). Congress' use of
passive voice adds to the confusion over the construction of § 1441(c). See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)
(1982) (providing for removal of entire case whenever separate and independent claim "is joined"
with otherwise nonremovable claim); see also Buckingham, Underwood, Barron, Wright & White
v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 208 F. Supp. 544, 546 (S.D. N.Y. 1962) (words "is joined with"
create problem with interpreting § 1441(c)). But see Note, Federal Procedure-Removal Denied
to Impleaded Party Under 28 U.S.C. 1441(c), 51 MICH. L. REV. 115, 117 (1952) ("is joined"
language in § 1441(c) pertains to claims plaintiff joins).
115. See Note, Diversity Removal Where the Federal Court Would Not Have Original Jurisdic-
tion: A Suggested Reform, 114 U. OF PA. L. REv. 709, 710 (1966) (courts need determine only
whether claim is separate and independent and not whether defendant is party courts should
protect). Congress did not prohibit third-party removal in the 1948 amendment to the removal
statute despite the existence of court decisions addressing whether a third-party defendant could
remove an entire case to a federal court. See Von Herwarth v. Gristede Bros., 20 F. Supp. 911,
912 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (court denied third-party removal because third-party claim depended on
outcome of main claim); Summers & Oppenheim, Inc. v. Tillinghast Stiles Co., 19 F. Supp.
230, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (court permitted third-party removal because third-party claim presented
controversy separable from main claim).
116. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Aaron-Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 1108, 1112
n.14 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (courts must interpret § 1441(c) by referring to § 1441(a)). Compare 28
U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982) (§ 1441(c) does not mention which party may remove case to federal
court) with id. § 1441(a) (§ 1441(a) specifically states "defendant" may remove) and id. § 1441(b)
(§ 1441(b) specifically states "defendant" may remove). Pursuant to § 1441(c), a defendant may
remove an entire case if one of two separate claims in the case "would be removable if sued
upon alone." See id. § 1441(c). According to § 1441(a), only defendants may remove. Id. § 1441(a).
To be eligible to remove a claim that "would be removable if sued upon alone," therefore, a
third-party defendant must qualify as a "defendant" within the meaning of § 1441(a). See Southland
Corp. v. Estridge, 456 F. Supp. 1296, 1301 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (§ 1441(a) requirement that only
defendants may remove controls § 1441(c)).
117. See West v. Aurora City, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 139, 141 (1867) (only party that has not
submitted to state's jurisdiction may remove); see also Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
313 U.S. 100, 106-08 (1941) (defendant's filing of counterclaim against plaintiff does not confer
upon plaintiff right to remove case to federal court); cf. Baldwin v. Perdue, 451 F. Supp. 373,
375-76 (E.D. Va. 1978) (filing cross-claim against codefendant did not enable defendant to remove
case to federal court because defendant voluntarily submitted to court's jurisdiction).
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jurisdiction of a court is significant because one purpose of section 1441 is
to free an out-of-state defendant from possible state-court prejudice by enabl-
ing the defendant to remove the case to a neutral federal forum." 8 For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff-counterdefendant'll cannot
remove a case from a state court to a federal court because the plaintiff-
counterdefendant voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the state court. 20
Unlike a plaintiff-counterdefendant, however, a third-party defendant does
not submit voluntarily to a state court's jurisdiction and can obtain a neutral
forum only through removal.' 2' A third-party defendant, therefore, qualifies
as a defendant for purposes of removal jurisdiction.' 2
Classifying a third-party defendant as a defendant for removal purposes
necessarily rejects the conclusion the White court reached that removal by
a third-party defendant is improper.'23 The White court denied third-party
removal, asserting that a third-party defendant is not defendant within the
meaning of section 1441(a).2 " Similarly, the Shaver court denied third-party
removal because a third-party defendant is not eligible to remove a case based
on section 1441(c).' 25 The Shaver court held that the only removable claims
are those claims the plaintiff made in the original complaint.2" The rationale
118. See supra note 1 (removal jurisdiction protects nonresident defendants); see also supra
note I (discussion of federal diversity jurisdiction). While the purpose of diversity is to protect
litigants from local prejudice, some commentators have questioned the value of diversity jurisdic-
tion. See Marsh, Diversity Jurisdiction: Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48 BROOK.
L. REv. 197, 221-30 (1982) (proposing modified doctrine of diversity jurisdiction prohibiting in-
state plaintiffs from bringing diversity actions to parallel § 1441(b) and increasing jurisdictional
amount to $25,000 to reflect inflationary changes); Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive
Side Affects and Potentialfor Further Reforms, 92 HAgv. L. REv. 963, 969-70 (1979) (abolishing
diversity jurisdiction would reduce choice-of-law problems in federal court).
119. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (counterdefendant is plaintiff defendant sues in counterclaim).
A counterclaim is a claim the defendant in a case files against the plaintiff. Id. A counterclaim
must arise out of the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the plaintiff's
claim. Id.
120. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941) (Congress did not
intend to reserve removal right to some plaintiffs and not to others); see also Coastal Air Serv.,
Inc. v. Tarco Aviation Serv., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 586, 587-88 (S.D. Ga. 1969) (defendant's filing
of counterclaim does not make case removable because plaintiffs cannot remove cases to federal
court).
121. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Aaron-Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 1108, 1113
(N.D. Il. 1983) (third-party defendant submits to court's jurisdiction involuntarily); see also
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 107 (1941) (plaintiff may not remove case
to federal court after defendant files counterclaim against plaintiff).
122. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text (defendants do not submit to court's
jurisdiction voluntarily).
123. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (discussing White decision).
124. White v. Baltic Conveyor Co., 209 F. Supp. 716 (D.N.J. 1962); see supra note 63 (third-
party defendant is not qualified to remove case to federal court under § 1441).
125. Shaver v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 171 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Ark. 1959); see supra
notes 66-77 and accompanying text (discussing Shaver decision).
126. Shaver v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 171 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Ark. 1959); see supra
notes 74-76 and accompanying text (Congress intended to limit removable claims to claims plain-
tiff joined).
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of the White court is faulty, however, since a third-party defendant qualifies
as a defendant under section 1441(a) because a third-party defendant does
not submit voluntarily to a state court's jurisdiction.'27 Likewise, the rationale
of the Shaver court is faulty because removable claims include third-party claims
under section 1441(c), which does not limit removable claims to claims the
plaintiff joined in the original complaint. 2 '
Once a court establishes that a third-party defendant qualifies as a defend-
ant within the meaning of section 1441(a) and that section 1441(c) includes
third-party claims among those claims that are removable, a third-party defend-
ant need establish only that the third-party claim meets the separate and in-
dependent claim requirement of section 1441(c) to remove the entire case to
a federal court.'2 9 While some commentators have questioned the constitu-
tionality of removing an entire case if a federal court lacks independent sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the principal claim, 131 many commentators believe
section 1441(c) is constitutional under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. 3 '
Ancillary jurisdiction permits a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over a
claim that has no independent source of federal jurisdiction, provided the claim
shares a "common nucleus of operative fact" with a claim over which a federal
court has original jurisdiction.'32 Pursuant to section 1441(a), a federal court
may exercise jurisdiction over a third-party claim if the third-party claim meets
the federal question or diversity of citizenship requirements of section 1441(b).' 33
If a federal court has independent jurisdiction over the third-party claim, the
127. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text (third-party defendant qualifies as defend-
ant for removal purposes).
128. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (Congress did not exclude third-party
claims from removable claims in § 1441).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982). In addition to qualifying as a defendant within the meaning
of § 1441(a), a third-party defendant also must meet the diversity or federal question requirements
of § 1441(b) to remove a case to federal court. See supra note 1 (requirements for defendant's
removal).
130. See Lewin, supra note 4, at 435-37 (criticizing argument that removal of entire case
is necessarily constitutional under § 1441(c) because removal of entire case was constitutional
under former statute); see also Duvall, Removal-The "Separate and Independent Claim, " 7
OKcLA. L. Rav. 385, 391 (1954) (Supreme Court has not determined constitutionality of § 1441(c)).
131. See 1A MooRE's FEDEAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, 0.163[3], at 317-19 (broad con-
struction of Article III of Constitution aids constitutionality of § 1441(c)); Cohen, Problems in
the Removal of a "Separate and Independent Claim or Cause of Action, " 46 Minn. L. Rev.
1, 25 (1961) (liberal joinder rules suggest constitutionality of § 1441(c); Moore & VanDercreek,
supra note 105, at 497-98 (doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction permits removal of entire case to
federal court even when case involves one federal question claim and one state claim between
citizens of same state). See generally Wills & Boyer, Proposed Changes in Federal Removal Jurisdic-
tion and Procedure, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 268 (1948) (proposing that federal court's retention
of entire case after removal be mandatory rather than discretionary).
132. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (court has power to hear
entire case if plaintiff ordinarily would try both federal and nonfederal claims in one proceeding);
see also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371 n.10 (1978) (Supreme Court
acknowledged that "common nucleus of operative fact test" may apply to diversity cases as well
as federal question cases).
133. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982) (providing removal jurisdiction to defendants); Id. §
1441(b) (removal jurisdiction requires federal question or diversity).
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federal court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the principal claim aris-
ing from a common nucleus of operative fact without violating the
Constitution.'34
While the constitutionality of removing an entire case pursuant to section
1441(c) no longer is in doubt among the courts, some courts differ over whether
a third-party claim is sufficiently separate from and independent of the prin-
cipal claim to warrant removal to a federal court under section 1441(c).135
Whether a third-party claim is separate from and independent of the main
claim, therefore, is crucial to a court's removal decision. 36 Some courts have
held that a third-party practice rule requiring that a third-party defendant be
liable to the original defendant for some or all of the plaintiff's claim against
the defendant necessarily precludes a third-party claim from being separate
from and independent of the principal claim. 37 A state court's decision that
impleader was proper under the state's procedural rules, however, does not
control federal jurisdiction over the third-party claim.' 38 A federal court,
therefore, must decide on the facts of the case whether a third-party claim
is separate from and independent of the main claim.'39
In determining whether a third-party claim is separate from and independ-
ent of the main claim, courts traditionally look to the role of the third-party
defendant in the case. 41 If a case involves a single wrong for which the plain-
tiff seeks relief, courts prohibit third-party removal on the theory that the
134. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966) (Supreme Court delineated
constitutional limits of federal power). Once a federal court has established the power to hear
a claim, the court must examine the specific statute governing jurisdiction to decide if the court
may exercise jurisdiction over the claim. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S.
365, 372 (1978) (both Constitution and congressional acts can limit federal jurisdiction). A federal
court may exercise jurisdiction over an ancillary nonfederal claim if Congress has not negated
jurisdiction expressly or impliedly. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) (statutory
law can limit federal jurisdiction over nonfederal claims).
135. See infra notes 143-45 (citing cases permitting removal based on separate and indepen-
dent claims); cf. Augenti v. Cappellini, 30 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 382, 384-85 (M.D. Pa.
1980) (third-party claim necessarily depends on outcome of main claim).
136. See infra notes 14046 and accompanying text (distinction between active and passive
liability is test for deciding whether third-party claim is separate from and independent of main
claim).
137. See Southeast Mortgage Co. v. Mullins, 514 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1975) (third-party
practice rules permit impleader only when third-party claim depends on outcome of main claim);
United States v. Joe Grasso & Son, Inc., 380 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1967) (defendant can not
maintain separate and independent claim against impleaded party).
138. See U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2 (grant of federal jurisdiction is within power of Congress);
cf. FED. R. Cry. P. 82 (federal procedural rules do not extend or limit federal jurisdiction). But
see Note, Third-Party Removal Under Section 1441(c), 52 FoRDMi L. REv. 133, 151 (1983)
(state decisions that impleaded claims are not separate and independent control federal jurisdiction).
139. See supra notes 19-53 and accompanying text (discussing examples of separate and in-
dependent claims in cases in which courts permitted removal).
140. See supra notes 19-53 & 80-98 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which court
decided whether third-party defendant could remove on basis of separate and independent claim);
see also Chase v. North Am. Sys., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 378, 380 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (Pennsylvania
permits third-party plaintiff to implead third-party defendant on basis of third-party defendant's
liability to original plaintiff).
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defendant impleaded the third-party defendant as an actively liable party.' 4 '
Examples of an actively liable party appear in products liability cases and breach
of warranty cases, where the third-party defendant has committed a wrong.'
42
If, however, a case involves a wrong to a plaintiff and a separate contractual
agreement between the defendant and the third-party defendant, courts usually
permit third-party removal on the theory that a court can preside over the
dispute between the defendant and the third-party defendant without reference
to the plaintiff's original claim. 4 An example of such a passively liable third-
party defendant appears in insurance cases.' 4 4 The independent nature of the
contractual agreement enables the defendant and the third-party defendant
to settle their dispute without reference to the plaintiff's original claim against
the defendant.' 4 A claim against a passively liable third-party defendant,
therefore, meets the section 1441(c) requirement that parties must be able to
litigate a separate and independent claim apart from any other claim in the
suit to remove the entire case to federal court.'"
Using the separate and independent claim analysis of section 1441(c), the
Carl Heck, Ford Motor Credit Co., Bond, Luebbe, and Chase courts all reach-
ed accurate conclusions. " The Carl Heck, Ford Motor Credit Co., and Bond
141. See Coleman v. A & D Mach. Co., 298 F. Supp. 234, 237 (E.D. Cal. 1969) (defendant's
breach of warranty claim against third-party defendant relating to defect in machine was not
separate from and independent of plaintiff's breach of warranty claim against defendant because
both claims involved same defect to same machine); Holloway v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 274
F. Supp. 321, 323-24 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (defendant's third-party claim for indemnification against
tire manufacturer was not separate from and independent of plaintiff's claim against tire retailer
because defendant could not recover damages until court entered judgment for plaintiff).
142. See Soper v. Kahn, 568 F. Supp. 398, 400 (D. Md. 1983) (defendant attorneys impleaded
legal publisher for faulty information third-party defendant published in law digest); Luebbe v.
Presbyterian Hosp. in N.Y., 526 F. Supp. 1162, 1163-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (defendant physicians
impleaded manufacturer for faulty manufacture of surgical instrument); Manternach v. Jones
County Farm Serv. Co., 156 F. Supp. 574, 577 (N.D. Iowa 1957) (chemical supplier could not
remove chemical retailer's third-party claim for indemnification because claim was dependent
upon outcome of breach of warranty action between retailer and chemical user).
143. See Marsh Inv. Corp. v. Langford, 494 F. Supp. 344, 350 (E.D. La. 1980) (defendant's
third-party indemnification claim against insurer involved policy interpretation and therefore was
not related to plaintiff's suit against defendant to cancel allegedly fraudulent mortgages), aff'd,
652 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1981); Wayrynen Funeral Home, Inc. v. J.G. Link & Co., 279 F. Supp.
803, 806 (D. Mont. 1968) (third-party claim against insurer for refusal to defend was separate
from and independent of plaintiff's original claim against defendant for negligence and breach
of warranty under contract to design and build).
144. See Bond v. Doig, 433 F. Supp. 243, 248 (D. N.J. 1977) (state law enabled defendant
to sue third-party defendant for declaratory judgment to determine extent of insurance policy's
coverage).
145. See Rafferty v. Frock, 135 F. Supp. 292, 293 (D. Md. 1955) (court should keep contract-
related controversy between insurer and insured separate from negligence-related controversy between
plaintiff and defendant).
146. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982) (permitting removal of entire case if third-party claim
is "removable if sued upon alone").




courts were correct in granting third-party removal because in each of these
cases the dispute between the defendant and the third-party defendant involved
contractual interpretations totally independent of the principal claim in the
suit. 48 The Luebbe and Chase courts also were correct in denying third-party
removal because in both cases the main claim and the third-party claim shared
common issues of causation and liability.'
9
In deciding third-party removal issues, a court necessarily balances a plain-
tiff's interest in selecting the forum against the third-party defendant's statutory
right of removal under section 1441.150 By granting third-party removal of
an entire case, a court takes away the plaintiffs choice of forum.'5 ' By disallow-
ing third-party removal, a court denies the third-party defendant the right to
litigate in a neutral, federal forum.' 12 Congress has provided a solution to
this dilemma by enabling the courts to exercise discretion to retain jurisdic-
tion over the third-party claim and remand any otherwise nonremovable claims
to state court.' 5 3 Most courts that have permitted third-party removal have
remanded the plaintiff's original claim to state court." 
4
148. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (contractual agreements between defendants
and third-party defendants usually are separate from and independent of main claims).
149. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (third-party claims against actively liable
third-party defendants usually depend upon outcome of main claim).
150. See 14 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 4, § 3724, at 646 (courts should
not force plaintiffs to litigate in forum that would not have had jurisdiction over cases without
addition of third-party claim); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982) (defendants have right to remove
cases containing separate and independent claims).
151. See 14 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 4, § 3724, at 646 (courts nor-
mally should honor plaintiff's choice of forum). In addition to subject-matter jurisdiction, per-
sonal jurisdiction requirements operate to limit a plaintiff's choice of forum. See International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (state court may assert personal jurisdiction
over defendant only if defendant had "minimum contacts" with state). Venue also can limit
a plaintiff's choice of forum. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976) (district courts may transfer actions
for convenience of parties).
152. See supra note I (nonresident defendants need protection from prejudicial state courts).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982). A district court may exercise discretion to remand the
nonfederal claim to the state court by mailing a certified copy of the remand order to the clerk
of the state court. Id. § 1447(c).
154. See Carl Heck Eng'rs, Inc. v. Lafourch Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 136 (5th
Cir. 1980) (federal court retained jurisdiction over third-party claim for indemnity but remanded
plaintiff's claim for breach of contract); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Aaron-Lincoln Mercury, Inc.,
563 F. Supp. 1108, 1117 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (federal court retained jurisdiction over third-party claim
of false misrepresentation but remanded plaintiffs claim for liability on financing contract). But
see Marsh Inv. Corp. v. Langford, 494 F. Supp. 344, 350-51 (E.D.La. 1980) (federal court retained
jurisdiction over both third-party claim for indemnity and main claim on fraudulent procurement
of mortgages because defendant delayed in filing motion to remand with court). Despite the in-
crease in procedural steps that results when a federal court retains jurisdiction over a third-party
claim and remands the main claim to state court, remanding the-main claim does not controvert
notions of judicial economy because judicial economy considerations are significant only in deal-
ing with trial time. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Aaron-Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 563 F. Supp.
1108, 1115 n.27 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (parties rarely litigate question of remand). But see 14 FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 4, § 3724, at 646 (increasing procedural steps subverts
judicial economy).
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In determining whether a third-party defendant may remove an entire case
from a state court to a federal court pursuant to section 1441(c), a court must
decide whether the third-party claim is separate from and independent of the
plaintiff's original claim.' 55 To make this determination, a court must examine
the facts of each particular case.' 56 A court should not refuse third-party
removal simply on the basis of a mechanical, strict construction of section
1441 and the general policy of limiting access to federal courts because such
strict construction will result in the denial of the right of removal by some
qualified third-party defendants.' Only a court's careful analysis of the claims
involved in the suit will ensure the protection of the rights of both the plain-
tiff and the third-party defendant.
58
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155. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text (discussion of actively and passively
liable third-party defendants).
156. See supra notes 19-53 & 80-98 and accompanying text (discussing examples of separate
and independent claims).
157. See supra notes 54-77 and accompanying text (discussion of cases construing removal
statute strictly to limit access to federal courts).
158. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text (discussion of balancing of plaintiff's
and third-party defendant's interests).
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